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This paper presents the outcomes of sidescan sonar and archaeological diving surveys in 2015 of two wrecked vessels located off Flotta Island, Orkney, North Scotland. Archival research indicates these are the remains of Anti-Torpedo Close Protection Pontoons (ATCPP), an experimental protection device used for close protection of naval vessels at anchor in Scapa Flow from attack by aircraft-launch torpedoes. The pontoons were only in operation in Scapa Flow for 13 months (March 1941–April 1942) and few were brought into service. As such they represent a rare heritage resource, for which very little is known about their operation.
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Scapa Flow, Orkney, is a large natural anchorage created by some 310 km² of sea, almost totally encircled by islands that provide shelter from the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. Having played an important strategic role as the main northern naval base for Britain in both World Wars of the 20th century (Hewison, 2005), Scapa Flow is left with a distinguished physical legacy of wartime monuments that survive around the coastal margins and under water. These have been described by historian Geoffrey Stell as ‘some of the best physical evidence of Britain’s wartime defences to be found anywhere’ (Stell, 2011: 9).
The value to society of Scapa Flow’s underwater heritage has been utterly transformed over the past century. From the exploitation of their intrinsic monetary value through extensive salvage in the post war periods of both World Wars (Masters, 1946; George, 2003), to the increasing appreciation of their social value as a source of indirect revenue with the arrival of underwater tourism in the 1970s and 1980s. Now, around 3000 divers flock to Orkney every year to dive in Scapa Flow, contributing significantly to the islands’ economy—and the German wrecks are the principal attraction. The cultural significance of Scapa Flow’s underwater heritage is also now widely recognized, principally through the decision taken in 2001 by Scottish Ministers to designate the remaining seven large intact German World War One battleships or light cruisers as Scheduled Monuments on account of their national importance, and by the status of the HMS Royal Oak and HMS Vanguard as designated war graves under UK military remains legislation.
Since 2001, several projects have been completed to map the extent of the surviving underwater heritage within Scapa Flow and to document and monitor site condition. While initial study focused on the scheduled German High Seas Fleet wrecks (Forbes, 2002), more recent studies have documented the much more widespread and diverse evidence that exists across Scapa Flow (Forbes, 2006; Dresch and McCarthy, 2012; Pollard et al., 2012; Pollard et al., 2014; Christie et al., 2014). In the future, the results of this work can be used to determine whether Scapa Flow’s wartime underwater heritage should be designated as an Historic Marine Protected Area (Historic Scotland, 2012), under the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010.
This paper presents the outcomes of recent surveys of two submerged wrecks off Roan Head, Flotta in Scapa Flow, and compares them to the remains of two other vessels that are visible on shore on Flotta and at Hoxa Head (Fig. 1). All four have been identified as the remains of Anti-Torpedo Close Protection Pontoons (ATCPPs). Data collected during the surveys presented here complement the national strategy, demonstrating the importance of a multifaceted research design combining historical and archaeological approaches to study lesser known type of heritage asset that might have otherwise been overlooked.
Survey objectives
The presence of a wartime vessel on the seabed close to Roan Head that was associated with several large piles of boom netting and a number of boom buoys was first brought to the attention of the authors by local charter vessel skipper Hazel Weaver. Historic Scotland commissioned a survey to confirm the identification, survival, character and condition of the remains of the previously unrecorded wreck-site in order to improve protection for and promote understanding and enjoyment of Scapa Flow’s underwater heritage (Historic Scotland, 2012). The specific objectives of the project were to conduct sidescan sonar surveys around the vessel and in the surrounding area to record and identify any associated submerged remains; and then to complete a diver survey to assess the character and condition of the remains.
Survey methods
Sidescan sonar surveys were completed over the target site and in the surrounding area using a standard C-MAX Sonar CM2 Digital Towfish with depth sensor. A medium frequency setting of 325kHz was used during the surveys, with the range set initially to 75 m (seven pings per second) and subsequently reduced to 50 m (9.1 pings per second) once the target site had been located. This resulted in either a 100 m or 150 m swathe during each run, at a sufficiently high resolution to distinguish wrecks and smaller objects.
An Evermore SA380 Marine GPS (accuracy +/- 3m), attached to the winch was used to collect spatial data. A counter pulley was secured to a davit at the stern of the vessel, to record the layback. The distance between the GPS and the counter pulley was then used during post processing to determine the location of the towfish (and thus the site) relative to the boat.
The sidescan sonar data was collected in MaxView and post processed using SonarWiz 5 following guidance in the 2013 Marine Geophysics Data Acquisition, Processing and Interpretation: Guidance Notes (Plets et al., 2013: 34–6). Scans were completed to ensure the target was within either the port or the starboard mosaic channel, thus minimizing potential data loss during slant range collection. A mosaic of the survey was produced and any sonar contacts identified were given unique identification numbers.
Four dives were subsequently made on the target site from MV Valkyrie. These dives aimed to complete a systematic survey to determine the extent of the debris, and to record any features not initially visible in the sidescan sonar data. The vessels were evaluated to elucidate their survival, identification, character and apparent condition. Video footage and stills photographs of key features of the vessels were taken for later review.
Survey results
The sidescan sonar surveys recorded the remains of two vessels at the target site, RC1 and RC2, and identified three other similar rectangular contacts, RC3, RC4 and RC5 (Figs 2–4, Table 1). Contact is the term used to describe items on the seabed that have a strong acoustic return or stand sufficiently proud so as to produce a large shadow on the sonar mosaic. Numerous linear contacts, since identified as spars, several square blocks, a large circular contact, and several concentrations of boom defence debris—piles of net and associated buoys as identified by ground trothing in previous surveys (Christie et al., 2014: 56–60)—were also found in the survey area. It should be noted that drop camera surveys completed since this research confirm that RC3, RC4 and RC5 are all vessels of the same configuration as those at the target site.
The remains of two long, narrow vessels were observed during the dives completed at the target site, RC1 overlaying RC2. These lie on a silty bottom and have a sparse coverage of marine growth. Boom defence debris was recorded around the site, with particular concentrations abutting the north-west corner of RC1 and the south-east side of RC2.
RC1 is a large rectangular steel vessel approximately 30 m long by 10 m wide, which lies upright. Comprising three 10 m long sections, the flat ‘deck’ is populated with numerous items of machinery. The sections at each end have several pulleys running both along and across the vessel, posts with wire guides, cleats, fairleads, bollards and bitts (Fig. 5 a-f). Networks of wires from various points cover the remains. The pulleys are each associated with a 0.16 m-diameter aperture in the deck, and wires in situ in the pulleys pass through these apertures through tubes to the underside of the vessel. These items of machinery, which correlate to the strong returns across the sidescan sonar contact are in good condition with all elements intact.
On the central section of the vessel several other pulleys and posts were observed to surround a large winch, which has the capacity to operate 12 wires. This is the highest point of the vessel (Fig. 5 g-h). There are two clear walkways with a tread-plate on either side of the deck that facilitated safe passage for crew to access machinery inboard and outboard.
The boom defence debris to the north-west of RC1 comprised a large pile of circular and ovular steel boom buoys of varying dimensions and associated nets. The buoys have slight corrosion around distinct circular holes, likely caused by small artillery shells that would have been used to sink them, but were otherwise intact. It is probable that these buoys and nets were sunk after RC1 as they overlay the wreckage around the middle section.
RC2 is the same type of vessel as RC1, but which has overturned. The underside of the joints between each of the three 10 m-long sections are clearly visible and there are a number of apertures on the underside of the vessel that correlate to those associated with pulleys, now crushed, on the deck. Wires protrude from several of these apertures. These are attached to steel beams, which secure linear piles of boom netting. These coherent piles, which are not associated with buoys, lie along the south-east side of RC2. In the middle of the central section there is a large circular aperture, through which the remains of a crushed winch can be seen. Where accessible, divers surveyed the remains of the deck of the vessel. The same types of machinery and other features as were observed on RC1 were recorded supporting the interpretation that the two vessels have the same configuration.
Both RC1 and RC 2 are overlain by two long steel tubes, Spars A and B, which comprise several sections of piping joined together with flanges. During the surveys, a third, Spar C, was recorded to the south-west of the site, the flanges of which were subsequently observed in the sidescan sonar survey data. The distinctiveness of this feature on the sidescan sonar data, once noted, resulted in the identification of several other spars in the surrounding area.
Comparative examples
Following completion of the side scan sonar and diving surveys, two other vessels of the same configuration were observed on the shore—one near Roan Head on Flotta, the other on the beach beneath Hoxa battery. Both sites, previously observed and recorded, had heretofore been mis-identified.
The vessel on the beach on Flotta is largely intact. Referenced in the Canmore record for the remains of anti-submarine boom defences (Canmore ID 249683) as ‘…a flat metal structure extends into the intertidal zone on the Flotta side of Calf Sound. It is 1 m wide and at least 5 m long. The remnants of winding gear are attached to the seaward end’. The wreckage is actually much bigger than described.
Two sections of the vessel currently rest in the intertidal zone to the west of a large pile of discarded boom netting and the reported remains of a 20th-century beacon, although it should be noted that there are no charted beacons in the area. It is possible that this is the remains of an anchor for one of the Hoxa booms (Fig. 6).
The larger portion of wreckage, representing two sections of the vessel, is 20 m long by 3 m wide oriented approximately north to south. This is populated with the same machinery as was observed on the submerged vessels, laid out in the same configuration; however, very little of the associated wiring remains in situ. To the seaward end of this portion, which would have been the central section of the vessel, is the winch that would have had the capacity to operate 12 wires, oriented to pull the wires along, rather than across the vessel.
The smaller portion of wreckage, representing the final section of the vessel, has broken away and is resting perpendicular to the midsection, oriented east to west, in the water. It was not possible to examine this section in detail as, even at low tide, the water is too deep. The deck features were visually assessed and it is populated with the same machinery; albeit with a pair of bitts rather than a single bitt on the eastern end. It is likely that the western end of this section would have been joined to the remains on the beach.
Comparatively RC1 and RC2 are better preserved than the two examples on the shore. The pontoon on the beach is more exposed and particularly towards the seaward end, there is a high level of marine growth and corrosion. There is also some indication that some of the fittings and machinery have been removed, as evidenced by sections of burning—likely created by a blow torch or similar tool.
The wreckage of the vessel beneath Hoxa battery is more dispersed and is described on the Canmore site record for Leyni Geo (Canmore ID 314006) as ‘fragments of a large metal structure, possibly part of a ship or boom, are wedged fast between the rocks’ (Fig. 7).
This site includes the remains of at least one section of a vessel of the same configuration as the submerged wreck, broken and present in two portions. One large portion measuring 3.13 m long by 3 m wide with a height of 1.2 m is half way up the beach. Four circular apertures and associated tubes can be seen on the wreckage.
A second more fragmentary portion, which is wedged between rocks closer to the low-water mark is 3.18 m long, but is too broken up to gauge other dimensions. This is associated with several corroded piles of wire. Although the machinery and fittings from vessel are no longer in situ, a winch was observed close to the low-water mark in the vicinity of the rest of the wreckage with the same configuration of those observed on RC1, RC2, and the vessel on Flotta (Fig. 8).
Both portions of wreckage at Hoxa are much more dispersed and broken down than any of the other recorded sites. The identification of the remains as being representative of at least part of a vessel of the same configuration of the target sites is based on the winch, the join configuration for the sections—visible at one end of the larger portion of wreckage—the available dimensions and the presence of the apertures and their associated tubes.
Identifying the remains
The sidescan sonar and diving survey data were evaluated in light of data from Admiralty files sourced from the National Archives at Kew. These documents and photographs indicate the vessels are the remains of Anti-torpedo Close Protection Pontoons (ATCPPs). ATCPPs were an experimental defensive strategy brought into service to ‘counteract the menace of attack on capital ships and cruisers by Torpedo Carrying Aircraft’. The pontoons and other anti-torpedo defences were developed to supplement existing defences, such as fixed torpedo baffles, ‘with anti-torpedo nets secured round the ships themselves’ (ADM116/5790: 70)
Aircraft and capital ships
Developed at a time when there was a growing threat from aerial attacks, ATCPPs and the subsequent deployment of Landing Craft Tanks (LCTs) specially adapted to take close protection nets (ADM 1/12757), were important components that document the changing relationship between capital ships and aircraft.
During World War One the development of seaplanes and aircraft for use with fleets developed rapidly. This led to a variety of seaplane carriers and flying off platforms fitted to cruisers, battlecruisers and battleships. The world’s first aircraft carrier with a full-length flight deck HMS Argus was commissioned in late 1918, the war ending before it could take part in planned operations against the German High Seas Fleet in Wilhelmshaven using Sopwich Cuckoos (Layman, 2002: 190–95) armed with 17.7 inch torpedoes (Gardiner, 1992: 184). Early aircraft were slow with limited weapons lifting capabilities. This naturally limited the explosive power of the weapons that could be delivered (Gardiner, 1992: 44). Similarly the techniques for using aircraft carriers were at a very early stage of development.
Early battleships and battlecruisers reflected the relatively low threat of attack by aircraft. Anti-aircraft armament was limited and was mainly directed against high-altitude attacks by Zeppelin rigid airships. Similarly battlecruisers and battleships had to concentrate their armour-plating scheme to protect against projectile weapons. These schemes concentrate armour vertically and horizontally; armoured belts and armoured decks to protect machinery, magazines, command structures and main armament against gunfire. Armouring ships further for underwater weapons would seriously limit ship stability and was ineffective, face-hardened armour is not elastic (Gardiner, 1992: 34) and would not be able to counter the underwater shock of a torpedo explosion. Consequently World War One battlecruisers and battleships were bulged during World War One and before World War Two. This involved the fitting of extra compartments filled with air or oil fuel to absorb the effects of a torpedo hit (Brown 1983: 108–109).
These early bulges were just about capable of absorbing the explosive effect of a World War One torpedo but became rapidly inadequate against the explosive potential of newer torpedoes that were heavier and faster with more powerful explosives (Gardiner, 1992: 185). Newer battlecruisers and battleships such as HMS Hood, the Nelson class and King George V class battleships were designed and built with more advanced forms of underwater protection in the form of spaces filled with crushing tubes (Roberts, 2010: 12–13) and air-liquid- and air-filled spaces (Brown, 2000: 30–31) to absorb the impact of a torpedo hit. Heavier anti-aircraft armament such as quadruple 4-pounder pom-pom mounts, 20 mm Oerlikon and 40 mm Bofors guns were added in increasing numbers to put up a wall of flak against attacking planes and to direct fire down the cone of attack.
Despite the increasing threat of attack by heavier and more sophisticated aircraft with more explosive torpedoes and bombs, contemporary naval thinking was ambivalent about the potential of such attacks on heavily defended naval anchorages. Current usage of protective fighter squadrons, barrage balloons, on-shore anti-aircraft guns, and the weapons on the moored ships itself suggested that air attacks would be prohibitively expensive in terms of aircraft loss for actual damage inflicted on the moored vessels. This was especially true in light of the limitations of dropping air-launched torpedoes in shallow anchorages.
Torpedoes tend to dive deep in water when dropped by planes with the result that they would bury themselves into the mud of a protected anchorage. If they were launched closer to their target and the torpedoes did not bury themselves in the seabed it is highly likely that by the time they levelled out at their effective running depththey would have transited below the keels of their intended targets (Marder, 1981: 311–12). The alternative is that the torpedo is launched at a suitable distance but is then stopped by traditional anti-torpedo netting. This assumption was not unquestioned, but it did take the Taranto Raid of 11 November 1940 to prove how vulnerable moored battleships could be. Twenty-one slow and decidedly vulnerable Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers were launched from HMS Illustrious to attack the Italian Navy’s main battlefleet moored at Taranto on the heel of Italy. Of the main battlefleet, the Swordfish damaged two battleships and sunk a third in shallow water for the loss of only two aircraft, despite the anchorage being heavily defended.
Apart from inspiring the Imperial Japanese Navy with their potential plans for a raid on the US naval anchorage at Pearl Harbor (Loury and Wellam, 1995, Zimm, 2011: 12), the Taranto Raid offered worrying proof that aircraft could attack vessels at anchorage, and within their protective umbrella of torpedo netting. The Royal Navy realized that a closer form of protection was needed for capital ships, a form of protection that could be set up so close to a ship that it would not be possible to drop torpedoes between the protection and the vulnerable side of the moored vessel (ADM223/336).
Fearful that such an attack would be used against British assets, the Royal Navy trialled a number of approaches for anti-torpedo close protection, before finally opting for the deployment of the adapted LCTs. One experimental method of close protection was the ATCPPs.
ATCPPs: an historical perspective
While ATCPPs were clearly an important developmental component of the Navy’s close protection strategy, little historical data exists to establish the practicalities of their operation. In particular we have as yet been unable to find a schematic of the pontoons or specific details about how the various machinery that is fitted to them was operated to facilitate their use. As such, archaeological assessment of the remains provides a unique insight into their design and function.
Despite this, the limited historical records that are available contain sufficient detail for us to confirm the identity of the surveyed remains as being ATCPPs, as well as an opportunity to piece together potential reasons for their decommissioning and subsequent abandonment.
The historic sources describe the pontoons as 90 ft (about 27 m) in length and comprised of three 30 ft (about 9 m) steel sections which were bolted together. The top edges of the pontoons had a wooden rubbing strip for protection from other pontoons and the vessels they protected. Individual pontoons were ‘secured end to end to the required length of defence’ (ADM1165790: 70) and had nets secured underneath one side of them to a depth of 40 ft (about 12 m), the standard depth of close protection anti-torpedo netting (ADM1/12757). This created a net wall that protected the ship. For this to be effective the nets secured by the pontoons needed to be more than 60 ft away from the ship that was being protected (Bureau of Ordnance, 1944: 63). The raising and lowering of the anti-torpedo netting was controlled by the large winch on the centre section, which operated 12 wires—six to each end of the pontoon.
It is unlikely that the netting would have been unrigged when the pontoons were stood down and so it is probable that this would have been stored in a raised position beneath the vessel. This is likely to have had an impact on where the pontoons could dock as the depth of the netting beneath the vessels would have restricted their ability to come alongside harbour facilities. This could suggest that they would have been stored on nearshore moorings. Historic charts of the area to the north of Flotta show the positions of 18 mooring buoys close to shore but in sufficient water depth to facilitate the storage of these vessels with their associated netting. Post processing of the sidescan sonar data show that the target site (RC1 and RC2) and the second pair of rectangular contacts (RC4 and RC5) are situated close to specific moorings indicated on the historic chart (Fig. 1). This could support the interpretation that these moorings were used to store the pontoons when not deployed.
The winches on the pontoons recorded during this project are aligned to enable the wire to be pulled along the pontoon. Interestingly, historical photographs of similar pontoons in operation at other bases, such as Rosyth, show winches to operate at 90 degrees to those at Scapa Flow, pulling wire laterally across the pontoon, rather than along it. While the documentary sources clearly described vessels that conform to the configuration of the  wreckage we recorded during the surveys, it was the associated historic photographs, identified in another National Archive file, that confirmed beyond doubt the identity of the remains. The variances noted in the winch alignment in the photographs provide an interesting avenue for further research as it is unclear what factors motivated these differences and what impact this might have had on the operation of the pontoons.
The historic photos of the pontoons in operation protecting HMS Duke of York in the Firth of Forth indicate that the pontoons are held away from the ships they are protecting by linear beams (spars) (Fig. 9c). These appear to have been used to fend off the pontoons and keep them the required distance away from the ship. It is proposed that Spars A, B and C recorded during this survey are representative of these beams. Interestingly, these photographs also indicate that boom buoys were not part of the deployed ATCPP system. It is possible that additional boom netting and buoys were also stored alongside these vessels in light of the extensive and coherent piles of boom net associated with RC1 and RC2.
These photographs clearly show the operational challenges involved with their deployment. Sailors are shown standing on the pontoons, several of which are attached together, while they are being towed into position (Fig. 9a and 9b). Several of the challenges apparent in these photographs contribute to the Admiralty’s decision to replace them. The pontoons were found to be unsatisfactory as they required tugs or a Boom Defence Vessel (BDV) to tow them into position, they were hard to manoeuvre, required a lot of maintenance, and were not suitable for the conditions prevailing in Scapa Flow (ADM116/5790: 70).
The Admiralty reports (ADM116/5790: 70) indicate that ‘all pontoons were unrigged and decommissioned in April 1942’, although a note in Admiralty file ADM1/12757: A close protection Summary, which post-dates their decommissioning (16 October 1942) stipulates ‘one "set" of pontoons was still "in use" in Scapa Flow’. One ‘set’ of ATCPPs comprises 20 barges or individual pontoons.
Following their decommissioning, the ATCPPs were initially replaced by spar defence nets, which had the advantage of the Navy having supplies of standard Anti/Torpedo (A/T) nets readily available (ADM1/12757: Register No. B.D. 01315/42). While these were considered more efficient, the spar defence nets were also considered unsatisfactory suffering from 'the objection that tugs or BDVs were [also] required to tow them’ (ADM116/5790: 70). While the spar defence nets remained in commission until April 1944, two flotillas (23rd and 107th) of LCTs were modified and ‘fitted specially for A/T protection with nets slung underneath their hulls’ were brought into service to supplement these defences in December 1942 (ADM116/5790: 70). The modified LCTs had the advantage of being self-propelled with high freeboard enabling ease of operation for their crews in a variety of harbour conditions. Ironically the production of ATCCPs had been having an adverse effect on the production of LCTs, slowing it down. This was a considerable hindrance later in World War Two when the Allies went on the offensive as landing craft of all types were urgently needed to support these amphibious operations. Therefore it was found that, not only were modified LCTs more effective at protecting anchored vessels it was also more efficient and less disruptive to the existing landing craft production line if a batch of LCTs were modified.
Conclusions and future work
This sidescan sonar and diving surveys have confirmed that these vessels are the remains of experimental Anti-Torpedo Close Protection Pontoons, used for the close protection of vessels at anchor from aircraft-launch torpedoes. It is probable that these vessels would have been moored offshore in pairs when not in operation, and would have been towed into position when required. Once in place, anti-torpedo netting would have been lowered into position along the vessel to the required depth creating a wall of net that would protect the ship.
While the diving surveys provided an overview of the extent of the remains of RC1 and RC2, addressing issues of their identity, character and condition; more detailed maps and plans of the remains that document the routing of the in situ wiring and machinery have the potential to clarify questions of how the nets were deployed and how the pontoons were operated. Given the comparative sparsity of historic and archival information associated with these vessels, this work demonstrates the importance of using a holistic, inter-disciplinary approach that combines historic, geophysical and archaeological surveys to gain a more nuanced understanding of the remains. The geophysical and archaeological approaches offer an opportunity to assess the extent and nature of the remains, with scope to provide detailed plans of the vessels and their configuration that can help us gain a better understanding of their function and use. However, without the historic and archival data we would be unable to situate these vessels in the context of the military maritime strategy and history, nor would we have been able to visualize the challenges faced by the sailors in operating these pontoons.
Additional diving surveys should also be conducted on the remains of RC3, RC4 and RC5. Historic photographs of the ATCPPs deployed from Rosyth in action indicate that the central winch can be oriented to pull cable across rather than along the pontoons. Are the remaining three pontoons configured in the same way as RC1, RC2 and shore-based wrecks or are there differences? Additionally, what factors influenced the configuration of the vessels, and how did the orientation of the winch affect their operation?
The work commissioned by Historic Scotland as a result of feedback from the diving community has brought to light details of a rare heritage asset. While the remains of some of these experimental defence vessels have been recorded previously, as was the case for the shore-based remains on Flotta and at Hoxa, their identity, function and significance has heretofore been overlooked. It is hoped that the publication of this survey data may result in the identification of other ATCPPs enabling a fuller understanding of the extent of the resource, the operation of these defences and facilitating a greater appreciation of their role in the Second World War.
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Captions
Figure 1. Maps showing the location of the sites. (credit) 
Figure 1. Map of Scapa Flow showing distribution of sites discussed in relation to historic moorings as detailed on historic chart ©SeaZone Solutions Limited 2005 [SZ1120111.016]; Chart F.083 South-West Portion of Scapa Flow including Cantick and Switha sounds.
Figure 2. Sidescan sonar image of target site (RC1, RC2, spars and associated boom defence debris). (© Historic Environment Scotland)
Figure 3. Sidescan sonar image of RC3. (© Historic Environment Scotland)
Figure 4. Sidescan sonar image of RC4 and RC5. (© Historic Environment Scotland)
Figure 5. RC1 machinery: A) cleat; B) fairlead; C) bitts; D) pulleys running along and across the vessel; E) bollards; F) posts with wire guides; g and h) winch mechanism. (© Historic Environment Scotland)
Figure 6. Remains of an ATCPP on the beach of Roan Head, Flotta. (© Authors)
Figure 7. Distribution of ATCPP wreckage at Hoxa. (© Authors)
Figure 8. Remains of dispersed ATCPP wreckage at Hoxa. (© Authors)
Figure 9. Historic photographs showing ATCPPs in operation protecting the HMS Duke of York in the Firth of Forth (ADM 224/26): A) ATCPP being towed into position by a boom defence vessel; B) ATCPP close up showing on board conditions and machinery configuration; C) ATCPP alongside HMS Duke of York held away from the vessel by spars. (© National Archives)
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